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Abstract 
Higher cognitive functions are the product of a dynamic interplay of perceptual, mnemonic, 
and other cognitive processes. Modeling such interplaying processes and generating 
predictions about both behavioral and neural data can be achieved with cognitive 
architectures. However, such architectures are still relatively rarely used, likely because 
working with them comes with high entry-level barriers. To lower these barriers, we provide 
a methodological primer for modeling higher cognitive functions and their constituent 
cognitive subprocesses with arguably the most developed cognitive architecture today – 
ACT-R. We showcase a principled method of generating individual response-time 
predictions and demonstrate how neural data can be used to refine ACT-R models. To 
illustrate our approach, we develop a fully specified neurocognitive model of a prominent 
strategy for memory-based decisions – the take-the-best heuristic – modeling decision 
making as a dynamic interplay of perceptual, motor and memory processes. This 
implementation allows us to predict the dynamics of behavior and temporal and spatial 
patterns of brain activity. Moreover, we show that comparing the predictions for brain 
activity to empirical BOLD data allows to differentiate competing ACT-R implementations 
of TTB. 
 
Keywords: ACT-R, fMRI, response times, model comparison.
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If a theory covers only one part or component, it flirts with trouble from the start. 
 A. Newell’s (1990, p. 17) 
1. Introduction 
Research in cognitive psychology aims at identifying the mental processes that 
produce observable behavior – in Anderson’s (1990) terms, to find “the function that maps 
input to output” (p. 24). Yet, perceptual, mnemonic, and other cognitive processes typically 
generate behavior in interplay with higher cognitive functions. A prime example of such 
higher cognitive functions are processes of decision making. When trying to understand the 
processes underlying decision making, cognitive scientists have been relying not only on data 
about the decision outcome, but also on various types of data potentially indicative of the 
decision process itself. Such process data include response times (RTs), measures of 
predecisional information search (e.g., eye tracking, Mouselab; Duchowski, 2002; Willemsen 
& Johnson, 2011), or verbal protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). From those data, 
researchers try to infer what kind of decision mechanisms drove a persons’ choices. Yet, in 
doing so, they face a conundrum: Due to the abovementioned interplay of cognitive 
subprocesses, the observed RTs and eye movements are not only a function of decisional, but 
also of perceptual, attentional, and mnemonic processes.  
In addressing this conundrum many researchers try to keep all non-decisional 
processes constant in an experiment and rely on supplementary assumptions about these 
processes to evaluate the extent to which observations are consistent with a given decision 
mechanism. Those assumptions come in different forms. For example, some are explicit 
assumptions about memory, such as that the time to judge an object as recognized will vary 
as a function of frequency of occurrence in the media (e.g., Hertwig, Hertzog, Schooler, & 
Reimer, 2008). Others are assumptions about reading phases and key-stroke times, which are 
often assumed to be constant and then subtracted from observed RTs (e.g., Johnson, Schulte-
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Mecklenbeck, & Willemsen, 2008; Pachur, Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Brandstätter, 2013). 
Moreover, there are assumptions within data analysis procedures, such as that the probability 
of committing an error is equal for all decision trials (trembling-hand error, e.g., Bröder, 
2003) or that RTs are log-normally distributed (e.g., Glöckner, 2009). Finally, approaches 
differ in terms of their specificity and complexity, ranging from informal (i.e., verbal) 
assumptions about the average duration of potential arithmetic and reading operations (Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) to formal (i.e., mathematical or computational) theories of, for 
example, memory (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999).  
While such approaches have been followed to identify specific regularities in the 
observed data speaking to different cognitive processes of interest, very few researchers 
actually model how those cognitive processes dynamically interplay and, consequently, 
produce observable RTs, eye movements, and other process data. Yet, this can be 
problematic when attempting to identify specific cognitive mechanisms. Is a model’s 
description of the data (in)adequate because of the main or because of the supplementary 
assumptions (see epigram above)? What has been called the irrelevant specification problem 
(Lewandowsky, 1993; A. Newell, 1990),1 revolves around the dilemma of whether 
assumptions make psychological claims or whether they merely serve to enable the 
generation of predictions. In the worst case, incorrect assumptions will lead to patterns in 
observed data being wrongly attributed to the cognitive process of interest (e.g., decisional 
processes).  
Moreover, while behavioral data—including outcome data (i.e., overt decisions) and 
non-physiological process data (i.e., RTs, eye movements, verbal protocols)—inform us 
about at least some aspects of a cognitive task, they do not provide sufficient constraints to 
 
1 When translating an underspecified theory into a precise formal model, a lot of details have to be specified in 
the code, which are not part of the original theory. The irrelevant specification problem poses the question of 
which of those details can be considered part of a psychological theory and which not. 
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unequivocally identify the underlying cognitive subprocesses, because “there is an infinite 
number of mechanisms that compute the same input-output function[]” (Anderson, 1990, p. 
24). In fact, Anderson’s critique, known as the identifiability problem, puts into question any 
process model that is developed and tested only through behavioral data. Instead, he 
contends, we need the type of neural data that “traces out the states of computation in the 
brain” (Anderson, 1990, p. 25) to pin down the mental steps a participant goes through. 
Ideally, taking into account neural data would allow researchers to deduce the dynamics of 
these cognitive processes from physiological data on the temporal and spatial patterns of 
brain activity. However, how can task-related activity in specific brain regions be related to 
dynamically interplaying cognitive mechanisms? 
Cognitive Architectures  
 A formal description of temporal and spatial patterns of brain activity in different 
tasks can be provided by cognitive architectures. A cognitive architecture is a quantitative 
model that applies to many different behaviors and that casts theories of memory, perception, 
action selection, and other components of cognition into a single mathematical or 
computational system (for an introduction to cognitive architectures, see, e.g., Gluck, 2010). 
At present, the most detailed cognitive architecture is ACT-R (Anderson, 2007; for other 
architectures, see e.g., Eliasmith, 2013; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; A. Newell, 1990). ACT-R has 
been continuously developed and updated over the last decades to incorporate current 
findings and theoretical ideas in a principled manner. ACT-R simultaneously generates 
multiple types of quantitative behavioral and neural data, ranging from RTs and eye 
movements to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or electroencephalography 
(EEG) data. Indeed, ACT-R is being increasingly used in combination with neural data to 
link neural activation patterns with specific cognitive processes (see Anderson, Fincham, Qin, 
& Stocco, 2008). Moreover, neural data have been relied on to more rigorously test cognitive 
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models composed of those cognitive processes (see, Borst & Anderson, 2015, for an 
overview of these approaches). All this makes ACT-R an excellent tool to address the 
irrelevant specification and identifiability problems.  
ACT-R is widely used by a large worldwide community and applied to areas as 
diverse as airplane flying (Byrne & Kirlik, 2005), intelligent tutoring (Ritter, Anderson, 
Koedinger, & Corbett, 2007), skill acquisition (Taatgen, Huss, Dickison, & Anderson, 2008), 
or list memory (Anderson, Bothell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998; see http://act-
r.psy.cmu.edu/publication/ for a complete list of publications). Yet, building a model in ACT-
R comes with at least three important entry-level barriers. First, users need to fully 
understand the theory. However, this is not trivial, because ACT-R consists of models of 
various aspects of cognition (e.g., memory, perception, procedural knowledge) and their 
interaction. Second, users need to know how to implement their hypotheses in this 
computational modeling framework, which is instantiated as a programming language with 
built-in human constraints, written in Common Lisp. Third, users need to be aware of 
methods for developing, calibrating, and testing complex architectural models.  
 Our goal in this article is to guide scientists modeling process data with ACT-R. In 
offering this methodological primer, we complement the extensive tutorial that comes with 
the ACT-R software (available at http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/software/) and the excellent step-
by-step tutorial of how to use the architecture with fMRI data (Borst & Anderson, 2017) in 
three ways. First, we illustrate how ACT-R model parameters can be empirically constrained 
on separate experimental tasks in a principled manner. Second, we showcase the capability of 
these constrained models to generate participant-specific behavioral predictions (e.g., RT 
distributions). Third, we illustrate how BOLD data can help to further refine a model beyond 
what can be achieved from behavioral data alone.  
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 We will first introduce the formal underpinnings of ACT-R and demonstrate how to 
develop a neurocognitive model for a prominent strategy in memory-based decision making, 
the take-the-best (TTB) heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). To develop our model, we 
will rely on an fMRI experiment, in which participants were instructed to follow that decision 
strategy (Khader et al., 2011, Exp. 1). We will demonstrate how the parameters of our model 
can be empirically estimated in a behavioral task in that study that precedes the actual 
decision task. We will then generate individual predictions about RTs in the decision task and 
compare those to the empirical data. Finally, we will showcase how to use the BOLD 
predictions of our model to further refine it.  
2. Overview of ACT-R 
In order to model and predict behavior and brain activation with ACT-R, different 
cognitive processes are modeled by separate modules, which have been mapped onto 
different brain areas (see Figure 1). These modules include perceptual ones, namely a visual 
and an aural module, which model focused attention to perceptual input and are mapped to 
regions reflecting advanced perceptual processing: the secondary auditory cortex and 
fusiform gyrus, respectively. There are also vocal and manual modules, which model speech 
and typing on a keyboard, respectively. These output modules are mapped onto two regions 
in the central sulcus where the hand, and face and tongue are represented. Furthermore, there 
are three central cognitive modules: The goal module tracks an agent’s goals; this module 
maps onto the anterior cingulate cortex. The imaginary module holds information relevant to 
the task and problem state at hand. This module corresponds to posterior parietal cortex—a 
region hypothesized to be involved in the transformation of mental representations. How 
information is stored in and retrieved from declarative memory is modeled by the declarative 
module. This module is associated with the lateral inferior prefrontal cortex. All modules can 
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operate in parallel, but within each module, information is processed serially (Byrne & 
Anderson, 2001).  
Perceptual and central cognitive modules operate on declarative knowledge (i.e., 
explicit memory). Such knowledge is modeled by chunks. Chunks represent information 
input from the visual and aural modules, the current goal of the cognitive system, information 
relevant to the problem state as well as knowledge in long-term memory. Chunks are 
collections of attributes, called slots, and their corresponding values: 
(chunk-name2 slot1 slot1-value slot2 slot2-value slot3 slot3-value …). 
For example, we can represent factual knowledge, such as “Paris is the capital of France”, or 
current states of the world, such as “the bird sings loudly”, with the following two chunks: 
(capital-France name Paris role capital country France) 
(loud-bird-by-my-office object bird action sings adverb loudly). 
 A procedural module orchestrates the other modules and functions as the central 
bottleneck in information processing (Figure 1). The procedural module is associated with the 
basal ganglia—a system hypothesized to implement conditional information routing to the 
cortex (Stocco, Lebiere, & Anderson, 2010). This module is instantiated as a production 
system (i.e., A. Newell, 1973), that is, it consists of a collection of production rules (if-then 
rules). The productions’ conditions (the “if”-parts of the rules) are matched against the 
current state of the other modules (e.g., whether something is retrieved from memory or 
whether an object is visually attended to). Production rules, whose conditions are met, can 
fire, that is, they can direct other modules to change their current state. Examples of 
production rules in natural language are: 
1. IF an object is visually attended to and the goal is to look at it, 
THEN visually encode the object of attention. 
 
2 For convenience, chunk names (e.g., capital-France) are used in ACT-R to refer to chunks. Those names are 
not considered to form part of the chunk itself. 
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2. IF the goal is to guess the name of a country’s capital and France is currently 
stored into the problem state,  
THEN attempt to recall the name of France’s capital. 
Production rules do not access modules’ contents directly, but via buffers. Buffers 
serve as communication channels between modules and productions, and as such can create a 
bottleneck for information transfer (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). For example, if the 
procedural module needs to access information in the visual field, the visual module has to 
first place that information (in the form of a chunk) into the visual buffer. Likewise, when a 
production rule sends a retrieval request to the declarative module, the retrieved information 
(i.e., a chunk) must first be placed in the retrieval buffer before another production rule can 
utilize it. In essence, when an ACT-R model is run, requests are sent to modules, which leads 
the modules to execute operations. After completing those operations, modules can place 
chunks into their respective buffers. Reversely, production rules await those chunks to be 
placed into specific buffers to match the conditions specified in their “if-part”. Once those 
conditions are met, the rules can fire (i.e., execute their “then-part”) and send further 
processing requests to modules. The serial operation of modules and the time that it takes 
them to complete their operations creates delays and bottlenecks in the system. Altogether, 
this complex interaction between the procedural and other modules (Figure 1) produces 
behavior.  
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Figure 1. The modular organization of the cognitive system and module-to-brain mappings 
according to the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Seven modules interact with each other 
through an eighth, procedural, module. The procedural module communicates with the other 
modules through buffers, represented as small rectangles. The cognitive architecture interacts 
with the environment (e.g., in an experiment: with a computer screen and/or a keyboard) 
through its perceptual and motor modules. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; LIPFC = lateral 
inferior prefrontal cortex; PPC = posterior parietal cortex. See the online article for the color 
version of this figure. 
  
ACT-R’s Subsymbolic System 
The modules and buffers can be best thought of as an “upper” symbolic layer of the 
architecture. ACT-R distinguishes that symbolic system from a “lower” layer, called the 
subsymbolic system. The subsymbolic system shapes the outcome of each module’s and each 
buffer’s operations. Specifically, the subsymbolic system describes memory retrieval, the 
ACT-R PRIMER FOR DECISION MAKING 
11 
 
selection of different production rules, visual and other processes in terms of a series of 
mathematical equations. Those equations determine, for example, how likely and how 
quickly memories can be retrieved, which of several alternative courses of action will be 
executed, or how long a key press will take.  
 An important component of ACT-R’s subsymbolic system are the equations 
governing the retrieval of memory traces (i.e., of chunks). Altogether, these equations cast 
memory as an information-processing device that systematically exploits the statistical 
patterns of occurrence of stimuli in the world. Specifically, memory can be thought of 
inferring the probability that a memory trace of stimuli will be needed based on the history of 
past encounters with those stimuli in order to achieve future processing goals. The history of 
past encounters, in turn, probabilistically hinges on patterns of occurrence of those stimuli in 
the world. For instance, we are more likely to learn about car brands and cities that occur 
more often in the media. In real world environments, patterns of past occurrence of stimuli 
are predictive of future ones (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 1991; Schooler & Anderson, 1997). 
To illustrate this, the more often an object (e.g., a name) has been mentioned in the news in 
the past, the more likely it is that this object will be mentioned again in the future. Similarly, 
the longer it has been since an object has last been mentioned, the less likely it is that the 
object will be mentioned again in the future. These lawful relations in information occurrence 
in the environment allow memory to guide present information-processing demands, for 
example, by retrieving memory traces of recently encountered stimuli more quickly or by 
setting aside (i.e., forgetting) information that has been encountered infrequently or a long 
time ago. 
Specifically, in ACT-R each chunk i has an activation, Ai, associated with it that 
quantifies the strength of that memory trace. Activation models the likelihood that a chunk is 
needed to achieve a given processing goal at the current moment. Activation itself is fed by 
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three subcomponents—the chunk’s base-level activation, Bi, the spreading activation, SAi,  
and noise, ε: 
    𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 + 𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝜀.     (1) 
The base-level activation is a function of the chunk’s history: 
    𝐵𝑖 = ln ∑ 𝑡𝑘
−𝑑𝑛
𝑘=1 ,     (2) 
where the decay parameter, d, specifies the rate forgetting over time, which is modeled in 
terms of a power function. The parameter n represents the number of encounters with the 
information that chunk i represents, and tk is the time since the k
th encounter. Those latter two 
parameters capture the history of encountering stimuli in the world. 
 SAi, quantifies a chunk’s relevance in the current context by assuming that chunks 
related to what is currently the focus of attention are more likely to be needed than those that 
are not. In ACT-R, context is modeled as all chunks currently stored in the buffers. Thus, 
spreading activation to chunk i in declarative memory is a function of the associations 
between that chunk and the chunks j currently in the buffers:  
    𝑆𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑗 .     (3) 
The amount of spreading activation SAi is determined by the associative strength, Sji, between 
chunks i and j, which is weighted by the source activation, Wj, of chunk j in a buffer. The 
associative strengths, Sji, between chunks is approximated by 
     𝑆𝑗𝑖 = 𝑆 − ln(𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑗),     (4) 
where S denotes the maximum associative strength and fanj is the number of chunks 
associated with a chunk j. The more chunks are associated with a chunk in memory, the lower 
the associative strength between it and each of its associates becomes. 
 Finally, retrieval noise, ε, is added to the base-level and spreading activation 
components when a retrieval request is made. ε is generated from a logistic distribution with a 
mean of zero and a variance of 
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      𝜎𝑑
2 =
𝜋2
3
𝑠𝑑
2,      (5) 
where sd is a free parameter. The random nature of activation means that at each specific time 
a chunk can have an activation higher or lower than its mean.  
 A chunk can be retrieved only when its current activation value is above the retrieval 
threshold, τ. The retrieval probability, pi, of a chunk is the probability that its activation 
exceeds this threshold:  
     𝑝𝑖 =
1
1+𝑒
−
𝜇𝐴𝑖
−𝜏
𝑠
,     (6) 
where 𝜇𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 + 𝑆𝐴𝑖 is the mean of the activation distribution. The time required for 
retrieval is scaled by a latency factor F:  
     𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝐴𝑖.     (7) 
Thus, more active chunks are more quickly retrieved. If no chunk matches a retrieval request 
or if the matching chunk with the highest activation is below the retrieval threshold, a 
retrieval failure will occur. The retrieval failure time is: 
     𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝜏.    (8) 
  Another important component of the subsymbolic system are the equations governing 
ACT-R’s production rules. Various higher-order cognitive functions are implemented in 
ACT-R as sets of productions that specify, for instance, what the goals of the decision maker 
are (e.g., making inferences about car brands as accurately as possible), when and how that 
person will encode information in his/her environment (e.g., reading the names of different 
car brands in a catalogue or on a computer screen) and when and how the participant will 
search for information in memory (e.g., what facts about different cars will be recalled). 
These equations determine which production rules will be executed in case the conditions 
(i.e., the if-parts) of several of those if-then rules are met. According to these equations, the 
productions that have been most successful in the past are the ones that are most likely to be 
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chosen, with production success being quantified by its utility. A production’s utility is 
learned according to the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule (Wagner & Rescorla, 1972): 
   𝑈𝑖(𝑛) = 𝑈𝑖(𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼[𝑅𝑖(𝑛) − 𝑈𝑖(𝑛 − 1)],                                 (9) 
where Ui(n) is the utility of the production after its n
th application, Ui(n-1) is its utility after 
the n-1th application and Ri(n) is the reward that it receives on the n
th application. Basically, 
upon each application of a production, its utility is updated in the direction of the reward that 
it receives: If the reward is lower than its current utility, the utility will decrease, whereas if it 
is higher, it will increase. 
 
ACT-R and Brain Activation 
To derive predictions regarding brain activation, ACT-R draws on the relationship 
between brain activity and blood supply (e.g., Boynton, Engel, Glover, & Heeger, 1996): 
metabolic demand in an active brain region leads to an increased blood supply to that region, 
measured as a hemodynamic response (HR). The HR is not immediate, but peaks around 6 
seconds after the metabolic demand. Its temporal profile, labeled the hemodynamic response 
function (HRF), is described by a gamma distribution or a mix of two gamma distributions. 
Here, we will use the canonical HRF as implemented in the SPM fMRI analysis software 
(statistical parametric mapping; Friston et al., 1998; see Figure 2 for a visualization of this 
HRF): 
    𝐻𝑅𝐹𝑆𝑃𝑀(𝑡) =
6𝑡5𝑒−𝑡
Γ(6)
−
1
6
16𝑡15𝑒−𝑡
Γ(16)
 ,   (10) 
where Γ is the gamma function. 
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Figure 2. SPM’s canonical HRF. 
 
Once an ACT-R model has been developed, generating BOLD response predictions 
involves the following steps: First, the activity of each module is described with a demand 
function D(t). Here, we follow the standard assumption that whenever a module is active 
[D(t) = 1], the brain region associated with this module is active [else, D(t) = 0 and the brain 
region is inactive]. We then assume that at each moment when that brain region is active, it 
responds according to the HRF in Equation 10 (see Borst & Anderson, 2017). The resulting 
HR prediction is a convolution of the demand function over the entire experiment, and that 
HRF: 
     𝐻𝑅(𝑡) = (𝐷 ∗ 𝐻𝑅𝐹)(𝑡).   (11) 
The HR predictions can be related to brain activation data in two ways: model-based 
fMRI analysis and region-of-interest (ROI) analysis (e.g., Borst & Anderson, 2015). Recall 
that ACT-R’s modules are assumed to mediate different cognitive functions (e.g., declarative 
memory, vision). In model-based fMRI analysis, the blood-oxygenation-level-dependent 
(BOLD) response prediction of each ACT-R module is regressed against all voxels in the 
experimental data, which, in turn, allows identifying the brain correlates of the modules. This 
approach has been used to identify regions in the brain that strongly correlate with module 
activity. 
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While model-based fMRI analysis serves to establish module-to-brain mappings, ROI 
analysis uses already established mappings to evaluate cognitive models. Specifically, ROI 
analysis compares BOLD predictions associated with different cognitive processes to brain 
activation in predetermined regions.3 In contrast to analyses involving behavioral data, an 
ROI analysis of neural data is especially useful for testing cognitive models (e.g., Anderson, 
Carter et al., 2008; Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, & van Rijn, 2010), because neural data relate 
directly to each individual module’s activity.  
 Next, after introducing the decision strategy that will serve as a case-in-point – TTB – 
we will demonstrate how ACT-R models work and how predictions for that strategy can be 
derived and tested. We will use both behavioral data and neural data in a ROI analysis to test 
the detailed cognitive model of TTB. 
 
3. An Example of Decision Processes: The TTB Heuristic 
TTB is a representative of an important class of decision strategies that implement 
sequential information search. TTB and similar lexicographic models, such as elimination-
by-aspects (Tversky, 1972), stand in contrast to the classic assumption that people integrate 
and weight available evidence to make decisions (Chase, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 1998), such 
as in subjective expected utility theory (Edwards, 1954), or other compensatory weighted-
additive strategies (e.g., Payne et al., 1993). TTB is a model of inference: It uses objects’ 
(e.g., cell phones, car brands, cities) attributes (e.g., whether a cell phone is recommended by 
others) to infer which of two objects has the larger value on an unknown criterion (e.g., the 
phone’s quality). To this end, TTB operates on attributes with binary attribute values that are 
coded as 1 if positive (e.g., phone is recommended) or 0 if unknown or negative (not 
 
3 For Talairach coordinates of those brain regions, see Anderson, Fincham et al. (2008). For MNI coordinates, 
see Borst, Taatgen, Stocco, and van Rijn (2010). Note that Borst, Nijboer, Taatgen, van Rijn, and Anderson 
(2015) have further refined those brain mappings through a data-driven model-based approach.  
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recommended). When making inferences, TTB inspects attributes in order of their 
importance. Once two objects have different values on an attribute i (i.e., one has a value of 
1, the other of 0), that is, once a discriminating attribute is found, TTB makes a decision 
without considering further information (i.e., other attributes). In the literature, this decision 
process has been described in terms of three building blocks (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2010): 
 Search rule: Search through attributes in the order of their validity. 
Stopping rule: Stop search as soon as an attribute is found that discriminates 
between the objects. 
Decision rule: Infer that the object with the positive attribute value has the 
higher value on the criterion of interest.  
TTB has been shown to be spontaneously used in particular under conditions with 
high information cost, including memory-based (rather than screen-based) decisions (e.g., 
Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). The notion underlying TTB that 
people sometimes ignore information has triggered a large number of empirical studies 
(Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bobadilla-Suarez & Love, 2017; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003; 
Juslin, Jones, Olsson, & Winman, 2003; Pachur & Aebi-Forrer, 2013; Khader, Pachur, & 
Jost, 2013; Pachur & Marinello, 2013; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; for an overview, see Pachur 
& Bröder, 2013). To test TTB against information integration models, such as compensatory 
weighted-additive strategies, those studies have made use of RTs (Bröder & Gaissmaier, 
2007) and patterns of information search (B. R. Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003), often 
making the kind of supplementary assumptions about mnemonic, perceptual, and motor 
processes that we mentioned in the Introduction (Section 1). Indeed, as can be seen, the 
search, stopping, and decision rules used in the literature to describe TTB remain fully silent 
about how the decisional processes assumed by TTB nestle into the rest of the cognitive 
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architecture. Thus, developing an ACT-R implementation of TTB illustrates how to integrate 
TTB’s key theoretical assumptions about decision making (such as sequential and limited 
search) with mnemonic, visual, and other information-processing activities.  
 When developing an ACT-R model of TTB—or any other decision mechanism, for 
that matter—to unveil the cognitive processes behind a people’s decisions, it is important to 
ensure that the observed output on every instance (e.g., a trial in an experiment) is produced 
by that mechanism and not by another one. In the cognitive and decision sciences, many 
experiments present participants with a decision task and then, based on their responses, 
individual participants are classified, for instance, as “users” of TTB or alternative decision 
mechanisms (Bröder, 2000; B. R. Newell & Lee, 2011; Nosofsky & Bergert, 2007). While 
suited for testing competing models of decision making against each other, such data make it 
difficult to develop architectural models of TTB, because the observed data can, but need not 
be produced by TTB. A data set where participants’ reliance on TTB is ensured has been 
provided by Khader et al. (2011). In their experiments, participants were instructed to rely on 
TTB for their decisions while their brain activity was recorded, which renders this data set an 
excellent basis for illustrating how neurocognitive ACT-R models can be developed.  
4. Developing an ACT-R Implementation of TTB  
Khader et al. (2011) employed a memory-based paradigm, where two objects (here: a 
pair of fictitious companies) are presented on a computer screen and participants have to rely 
on their memory to recall previously learned attribute values and make a decision according 
to TTB. An ACT-R implementation of TTB should perform the same operations that a 
participant would: For example, it needs to read the object names and then recall objects’ 
attribute values in order to make a decision.  
The attribute values of objects are stored as chunks in the model’s declarative 
memory. What slots would these chunks consist of? In Khader et al.’s experiment, prior to 
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the decision task participants learned to associate objects (i.e., companies) with attributes 
(e.g., where the company is located and which product it produces) and their values (i.e., 
whether the attributes are positively or negatively related to the decision criterion; see Khader 
et al., 2011, for details). In our model, we rely on the following chunk structure to describe 
object attributes stored in memory: 
 (objectN-attributeM object-name objectN attribute-name attributeM attribute-value 
0/1).  
How are such chunks used to develop a model of TTB? In modeling participants’ declarative 
memory, in a first step, the model’s declarative memory is populated with all attribute values 
that participants learned prior to working on the decision task. 
Once we have defined the declarative chunk structure, we continue with outlining the 
sequence of steps that a model needs to go through. In addition to TTB’s search, stopping, 
and decision rules (see Section 3), we need to include all steps that a participant in an 
experiment would go through, such as visual and motor steps. For our task, these steps are: 
(1) look at the company names, (2) retrieve the attribute, (3) retrieve the corresponding 
attribute values, (4a) press the key on the keyboard that corresponds to the company with a 
positive attribute value if the attribute values differ or (4b) retrieve the next attribute in the 
hierarchy if the attribute values on the current attribute are the same.  
To translate these steps into a sequence of productions, it is necessary to consider 
ACT-R’s architectural constraints. For example, the visual module can only process objects 
serially. This means that the visual system needs to attend the first company name on the 
screen—an action guided by a production—and then encode that company name guided by a 
second production. Only then can it attend and encode the second company name. Similar 
buffer capacity and temporal constraints exist for other modules. For instance, the imaginal 
module can also only perform one operation at a time (e.g., store a chunk or modify the 
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chunk it currently holds) and that operation also incurs a time cost (i.e., 200 ms). Similarly, 
the retrieval module can only be attempting to retrieve one chunk from long-term memory 
and the time it takes to perform the retrieval is determined by Equation 7.  
Figure 3 shows a process trace of a run of the entire ACT-R implementation of TTB 
for a decision on which the most valid attribute in the hierarchy discriminates between the 
two companies.4 The components of the cognitive architecture are active at different points in 
time, with eight production rules coordinating the modules’ actions. In this example, the 
model first starts by comparing the two objects on the screen: It first looks on the left part of 
the screen (guided by production 1), reads the name of the company present on that part of 
the screen (production 2) and stores it in the imaginal buffer, while shifting its gaze to the 
right part of the screen (production 3). After reading (production 4) and storing the name of 
the company present there (production 5), the model checks if the companies are different 
and, if so, it executes TTB, starting with the most valid attribute (production 6). For the most 
important attribute, the model recalls the attribute value of the left company (also production 
6), then it recalls the attribute value of the right company (production 7) and finally, it 
compares them (production 8). Then, the model chooses the company to which that attribute 
is pointing and finishes with an overall RT of 2 s. Note that on other trials retrieval might be 
faster or slower, or more attributes might need to be examined prior to making a decision, 
which will lead to a different RT and a different relative activity of each module.  
 
 
4 See model “TTB_v1.lisp” in online materials at osf.io/25pt8 for the model code.  
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Figure 3. Schematic process trace of an ACT-R implementation of TTB. For the sake of 
illustration, the model trace schematically depicts arbitrary recall times (for actual times run 
the model in online materials at osf.io/25pt8). The y-axis denotes various ACT-R modules 
and associated brain regions. LIPFC = Lateral Inferior Prefrontal Cortex. PPC = Posterior 
Parietal Cortex. Eight production rules control the behavior of this model. Production 1 
directs visual attention to the location of the first object (company 1) and production 2 
requests that the visual module encodes it. Productions 3 and 4 repeat the same steps for the 
second object (company 2) and also request storing the first object in the imaginal buffer. 
Production 5 starts storing the name of the second object in the imaginal buffer. Productions 
6 and 7 request that the declarative module retrieves the attribute values of the first attribute 
for each object. Finally, production 8 selects the object with a positive attribute value my 
requesting a key press. See the online article for the color version of this figure.  
 
5. Testing the ACT-R Model of TTB 
In an initial learning task, the 17 participants memorized the values on 4 attributes 
about 16 fictitious companies; a total of 64 attribute values. In a subsequent strategy-training 
task, participants were instructed how use TTB. They also practiced to apply this heuristic, 
using a decision task different from that in the main decision task (a fictitious job-scenario). 
Finally, participants learned the hierarchy of the four attributes by indicating their importance 
repeatedly. In the decision task, participants’ responses and the associated RTs and BOLD 
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signals were recorded. One hundred thirty-two company pairs were presented (on the left and 
right side of the screen, respectively) in three blocks of 44 trials each. Participants were 
instructed to use TTB and the acquired attribute-knowledge to decide which of the two 
companies is more likely to be successful in the future. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 2, 4 
or 6 s (varied randomly), and each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 2 s.  
There were five types of decision trials, which differed in the number of attributes that 
TTB would need to consider prior to making a decision (i.e., none, one, two, three, or all four 
attributes). This is relevant because it is assumed that, due to TTB’s stopping rule, the time it 
takes to make decisions with this strategy depends on how many attributes have been 
considered before a discriminating attribute is retrieved from memory (e.g., Bröder & 
Gaissmaier, 2007). In control trials (i.e., where no attributes need to be considered) the same 
company name was presented on both sides of the screen and participants were instructed to 
respond directly, without retrieving any attributes. For further details on the experimental 
methodology, see Khader et al. (2011).  
A Roadmap for Model Testing 
We used data from Khader et al.’s (2011; Experiment 1) to develop and test an ACT-
R implementation of TTB. Figure 4 provides an overview of the various steps and stages of 
the procedure.5 First, we calibrated the model by fitting its free parameters in the learning 
task. To this end, we developed a recall model in ACT-R. We then used the estimated 
parameters from the learning task to generate distributional RT predictions for the decision 
task with the TTB implementation. Note that the parameters were not fitted to the data of the 
decision task, so these are genuine predictions. We also performed a ROI analysis to compare 
brain activation predictions to BOLD data. Finally, in an iterative process, we used the ROI 
analysis to further refine our model. Specifically, we constructed seven alternative 
 
5 Data, analysis scripts, and model files are available under osf.io/25pt8. 
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implementations of TTB and selected the implementation whose processing steps generated 
BOLD predictions best corresponding to observed data. 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of the different steps of model development and testing. (1) An ACT-R 
model of recall is developed to estimate perceptual-motor times in the learning task. (2) 
Memory parameters are estimated from the learning task. (3) An ACT-R model of TTB is 
developed, which uses as input the memory parameters estimated in the learning task. (4) 
Distributional RT predictions are generated using this model and compared with 
experimental RTs. (5) Module activity is mapped onto HR. (6) The predicted HR is compared 
to the experimental fMRI data. See the online article for the color version of this figure. 
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Model Calibration in the Learning Task 
 In order to rigorously test a model’s descriptive power, it is important to ensure that it 
performs well in predicting data out-of-sample rather than being able to fit data (e.g., Pitt, 
Myung, & Zhang, 2002). In order to derive predictions about RTs and BOLD responses in 
the decision task, we estimated ACT-R’s memory parameters for each participant from 
his/her RTs in the learning task (Figure 4, steps 1 & 2). During the learning task, different 
attribute values are remembered increasingly better across various rounds of learning (see the 
description of the learning task above), until the corresponding chunks are activated strongly 
enough to be retrieved with a probability of almost 1 (see Equation 6) in the last round of 
learning. Thus, the last learning round defines the peak activation of each attribute-value 
chunk. Moreover, it is temporally closest to the decision task. This renders a chunk’s 
activation at this point in time a reasonable approximation to that chunk’s activation at the 
beginning of the decision task. 
 ACT-R relates activation to RT as per Equation 7 (Section 2). We transformed this 
equation to estimate the activation of chunks representing attribute values from the retrieval 
time of each attribute-value chunk in the last round of learning: 
     𝐴 = − 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝐹
  ,    (12) 
where the latency factor, F, is left fixed at its default value (F = 1). This implies that 
estimating activation as per Equation 12 requires no parameter fitting.6 To assess retrieval 
time, we then assumed that 
𝑡retrieval = RT − 𝑡non−retrieval,     (13) 
that is, that the total RT consists of separable retrieval and non-retrieval components. We then 
estimated tnon-retreival by constructing an ACT-R model of recall in a learning trial, whereby we 
 
6 ACT-R includes parameters which shape the workings of its subsymbolic system. For example, these 
parameters determine how long retrieval takes, or low quickly one would attend an object in the visual field. 
These parameters have default values, which ensure consistency between models constructed within this 
architecture.  
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relied entirely on ACT-R’s default parameters (Figure 4, step 1). This model, shown in 
Figure 5, starts by looking at the company name. It then stores that name in the imaginal 
buffer and looks at the attribute. Once both attribute and company are available in the 
model’s buffers, the model attempts recalling the attribute value and responds by pressing a 
key on the keyboard. We computed the median duration of non-retrieval processes over 100 
runs7 of that model to estimate non-retrieval time. This was necessary because ACT-R 
assumes a certain variability in the operation time of its various cognitive components, such 
as visual attention and motor action. As a result, ACT-R makes predictions about the 
distributional characteristics of the RTs. Our model estimated a mean perceptual-motor time 
of 780 ms for the first attribute of a company and 495 ms for the remaining three attributes.8 
 
 
Figure 5. Schematic process trace of ACT-R model of recall. The y-axis denotes various 
ACT-R modules. This model operates through six productions. Productions 1 and 2 request 
that the visual module attends to and encodes the company name, while productions 3 and 4 
direct the visual module to attend and encode the attribute. Production 5 tell the declarative 
module to recall the value on that attribute and, finally, production 6 makes the appropriate 
response by requesting a key press from the manual module. For the sake of illustration, the 
model trace schematically depicts somewhat arbitrary recall times, and not those that a 
participant would likely need. See the online article for the color version of this figure. 
  
 
7 We ran each model 100 times, which strikes a good balance between number of data points generated and 
required simulation time. 
8 In the learning task of the experiment, attributes were grouped per company. Thus, a participant only needs to 
encode the company name for the first attribute.  
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 After subtracting the average tnon-retrieval from the overall RT, we removed outliers from 
the resulting tretrieval: Specifically, we first, we removed outliers on the left side of the 
distribution by eliminating all negative values; this amounted to 4.3% of all observations. 
Second, we removed outliers on the right side of the distribution by removing the 2.5% most 
extreme values (see Ratcliff, 1993, for general recommendations of outlier removal). The 
97.5th percentile of the distribution of all participants’ RTs was at 6.2 s. 
 To account for memory retrieval being inherently noisy, ACT-R models the noise on 
activation with a logistic distribution (see Equations 1 and 5). We assume that all 64 attribute-
value chunks stored in a participant’s memory are characterized by the same parameter 
values (logistic distributions with equal means and scales; Figure 4, step 2). This assumption 
is plausible for three reasons. First, all attributes have approximately the same learning 
history (i.e., they were presented similarly often and similarly long ago) and hence the same 
base-level activation. Second, all attribute-values receive the same amount of spreading 
activation, because every attribute is related to 16 attribute values (an associative fan of 16) 
and each company to 4 attribute values (a fan of 4). And third, by definition, there is a single 
activation noise parameter per participant. Starting from Equation 1, this assumption means 
that all chunks i for a participant have an activation: 
     𝐴𝑖~𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐(𝜇𝐴, 𝑠).    (14) 
In essence, three parameters have to be estimated per participant: the two parameters of the 
logistic distribution (mean activation 𝜇𝐴, and activation noise s) and, also, a retrieval 
threshold τ (see Equations 6 and 8). 
 Figure 6 shows, for three representative participants, the resulting fit of a logistic 
distribution to the 64 samples from the activation distribution from the last round of learning 
(corresponding to the 64 attribute values). These 64 data points are RT distributions 
transformed with Equations 12 and 13. The parameters of such a theoretical cumulative 
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distribution function provide an estimate of the mean activation and activation noise for all 64 
attribute-value chunks of a participant. To estimate each participant’s retrieval threshold, we 
set it equal to the activation of the least active attribute value (also, see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6. Examples of fitting a logistic distribution to learning data of three participants. 
Points show 64 empirically estimated activations from the last round of the learning task for 
each of the 64 attributes. The red line shows the fitted logistic curve, while the black line 
designates the value of the retrieval threshold. See the online article for the color version of 
this figure. 
 
RT Predictions 
The memory parameters, estimated individually for each participant, are used to 
derive predictions for the decision task: activation and other components feed into the TTB 
model described above (Figure 4, step 3).9 When generating predictions, all other parameters 
were set to their ACT-R default values. To mimic the exact experimental conditions, we 
added the timing details of an ITI of 2, 4, or 6 s, a fixation cross presented for 2 s at the 
beginning of each trial, and a presentation of a company pair until a response is made (see the 
description of the experimental procedure above) to the model presented in Figure 3. When 
the fixation cross is drawn, the model looks at it. When an ITI is presented, the model does 
nothing. Finally, when the two companies are presented, the model executes TTB: it reads the 
 
9 Given that the time elapsed between last round of the learning task and the beginning of the decision task is 
minimal, we assume negligible memory decay between those tasks. 
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company names sequentially, recalls attributes and attribute values and responds with a 
keypress (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for a trace of the complete final model, which also 
includes screen events and mental events for clarity).  
As mentioned in Section 2, ACT-R assumes that cognitive processes are inherently 
noisy, implying that the same process can produce different patterns of data. To model this 
variation, ACT-R models are typically run multiple times in a computer simulation. In our 
case, the simulation of the complete decision task, consisting of 132 trials, was repeated 100 
times for each participant. In so doing, in each simulation run and for each participant, stimuli 
(i.e., pairs of company names) were presented in the same order as the participants saw them. 
The resulting distributional RT predictions are compared against the empirical RTs (Figure 4, 
step 4). Figure 8 offers a snapshot of such a comparison by plotting median RTs and RT 
percentiles, together with empirical RTs for three participants (see the Supplementary Online 
Materials for plots for all participants). 
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Figure 8. Distributional RT predictions for three participants (over 100 runs) of the ACT-R 
model of TTB and observed RTs of the corresponding participants in Khader et al. (2011, 
Exp. 1). The trial index is shown on the x-axis. That index can be thought of as timeline, with 
the first trial corresponding to the first and the last trial to the last comparison of two 
companies in the decision task. The black line represents the median predicted RTs across 
trials; the dark grey strip is the region between the 25th and 75th RT percentile; the light grey 
strip is the region between the 10th and 90th RT percentile. The observed RTs are presented in 
yellow. There were 132 paired comparisons of companies in total. See the online article for 
the color version of this figure. 
 
The trial-by-trial RT predictions of participant 1 are summarized as a function of the 
number of attributes that need to be retrieved to make a decision and compared to 
experimental data in Figure 910 (see Supplementary Online Materials for such plots for all 
participants). When the same company name is presented on both sides of the screen and, 
 
10 There are few items, on which 3 attributes (16 items) or 4 attributes (8 items) need to be retrieved. As a 
consequence, we have grouped those items together to have a better representation of their distribution. Note 
that there are also only 8 items, on which no attributes need to be retrieved, but these exhibit a very small 
variability in response time and are thus not grouped with other items.  
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consequently, no attributes need to be retrieved, the model almost always responds within 1 s 
(Figure 9a; mediansim: 918 ms), while this subject more frequently needs between 1 and 2 s 
(medianexp: 1237 ms). Most participants (11 out of 17) also more frequently respond within 1 
s on such trials. Moreover, as can be seen, for this participant the more attributes need to be 
retrieved (1 attribute: Figure 9b, mediansim: 3788 ms, medianexp: 3816 ms; 2 attributes: Figure 
9c, mediansim: 6923 ms, medianexp: 7886 ms; 3 or 4 attributes: Figure 9d, mediansim: 11026 
ms, medianexp: 14854 ms), the more likely it is that his/her RTs deviate from the model 
predictions. This trend can be seen among most subjects with some subjects’ data aligning 
better with our predictions and some worse. We suspect that three factors contribute to this. 
First, sample sizes are smaller the more attributes need to be retrieved and, thus, each sample 
is more variable. Second, RT variability also increases with increasing RTs. Finally, the 
probability of not precisely following the prescribed strategy (e.g., by getting distracted or 
wrongly remembering an attribute value) increases the longer the execution of that strategy. 
Interestingly, some subjects exhibit very fast RTs (in some cases within 2 s) even on trials 
that require 3 or 4 attributes to be considered, which supports our last hypothesis. When 
developing ACT-R models, detecting such deviations by plotting predictions and data in 
different ways is important. This aids to gauge the overall performance of a model, and can 
uncover where further model refinements are warranted.  
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Figure 9. Comparison of predicted and observed RT distributions in the decision task as a 
function of the number of attributes considered for participant 1 from Khader et al. (2011, 
Exp. 1). Each count corresponds to a trial of that participant. See the online article for the 
color version of this figure. 
 
To further illustrate this point and examine inter-participant variability, one can also 
ask how well our model performs across all participants. In Figure 10 we compare the extent 
to which the empirically observed RTs deviate from the median predicted RTs (in terms of 
mean absolute deviation, MAD) relative to how much the model deviates, on average, from 
median predicted RTs on individual runs. How much the model deviates on each individual 
run from its median RT predictions provides us with an estimate of model variability. If a 
participant shows a smaller deviation from median model predictions than individual model 
runs, our model overestimates the variability in RT. On the other hand, if a participant shows 
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a larger MAD, our model either underestimates a participant’s RT variability or it 
systematically deviates from the participant’s RT. Figure 10 demonstrates that participants 
and model exhibit similar variability, although the empirical RTs typically depart more from 
the median predictions than individual runs of the simulation. Moreover, as noted above, as a 
participant needs to retrieve more attributes (0 attribute: Figure 10a; 1 attribute: Figure 10b; 2 
attributes: Figure 10c; 3 or 4 attributes: Figure 10d), his/her RTs depart more strongly from 
the predictions. 
 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of MAD of individual model runs and of experimental data from 
median predicted RTs of model as a function of number of attributes retrieved before 
deciding. RT absolute deviations were averaged over participant and trial type (i.e., number 
of attributes that need to be recalled). Error bars represented minimum and maximum MAD 
from the 100 runs of the model.  
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Neural Activation Predictions 
 In Section 2, we explained how HR predictions are derived in ACT-R. Figure 11 
illustrates, in practice, how the HR resulting from a module’s activity emerges (Equation 11). 
In this figure, the activity of two modules (declarative and visual modules), as described by 
their demand functions (light color), is transformed into predicted BOLD responses (dark 
color) for the first 50 s of a model run for a participant. Following the same procedure as for 
these 50 s, we derive BOLD-response predictions for each of the 100 model runs of each 
participant for the entire decision task (Figure 4, step 5). Thus, we are effectively able to 
specify the expected pattern of brain activation related to each of ACT-R’s modules, given 
the sequence of cognitive steps assumed by our model.  
 When engaging in such ACT-R modeling, the details matter: For instance, we model 
the repeated presentation of fixation crosses and ITIs in the experimental procedure (see 
Figure A1 in the Appendix, for a process trace of the complete final model). This is important 
for accurately generating BOLD predictions, because the repeated presence of fixation 
crosses and ITIs shape the time course of the HR. As can be seen in Figure 2, the HRF needs 
more than 20 s to settle back to its baseline level. Given that the fixation cross duration is 2 s 
and that the ITI is at most 6 s, there will always be some residual HR from the previous trial 
in the current trial (see the dashed lines in Figure 11, which represent the time point at which 
a new trial begins).  
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Figure 11. Transformation of visual and retrieval modules activity, as describe by the 
demand function, to HR for first 50 s of a run of an ACT-R implementation of TTB. The 
beginning of each trial is denoted with a dashed line. The HR often has not decayed to 
baseline before the beginning of the subsequent trial. See the online article for the color 
version of this figure. 
 
 Following the ROI procedure, these HR predictions, associated with different 
cognitive processes specified in the model were compared to the observed brain activity. 
BOLD signals were extracted from module-specific areas based on the center coordinates and 
ROI sizes provided in Anderson (2007).11 To mimic an fMRI scan, model predictions were 
averaged every 2 s. Then, for both predictions and observations, the first scan of each trial for 
that participant (and that model run in the case of the predictions) served as baseline – BOLD 
response was estimated relative to its magnitude. Finally, both predicted and observed BOLD 
 
11 All coordinates are in Talairach space: declarative module: x = +/- 43, y = 23, z = 24; imaginal module: x = 
+/-23, y = -63, z = 40 ; procedural module: x = +/-14, y = 10, z = 7; manual module: x = +/-41, y = -20, z = 50; 
visual module: x = +/-42, y = -61, z = -9 (from Anderson, 2007, p. 189). 
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responses for all participants were grouped according to the number of attributes that have to 
be considered before a decision can be made and averaged over bins of 2 s. Figure 12 
compares predictions for the five modules of interest12 and observations from the 
corresponding regions in both the left and right hemisphere. The first column of Figure 12 
plots recordings from the left hemisphere, the second from the right hemisphere, and the third 
column plots our model predictions.  
   
 
12 ACT-R currently does not generate separate predictions for each hemisphere. 
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Figure 12. Observed and predicted BOLD responses for ten brain regions, associated with the 
manual, procedural, declarative, visual, and imaginal modules. LIPFC = Lateral Inferior 
Prefrontal Cortex. PPC = Posterior Parietal Cortex. BG = Basal Ganglia. FG = Fusiform 
Gyrus. The x-axis represents the time point in the trial at which the BOLD signal is measured 
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or predicted, while the y-axis represents the signal change relative the first scan of that trial. 
The different degrees of brightness are associated with a different number of attributes that 
need to be retrieved before TTB makes a decision. The BOLD response is averaged over all 
participants and trials that require that number of attributes to be retrieved. Only points 
averaged from least 20 observations are included in the plot, because the empirical data 
become very noisy with just a few observations. See the online article for the color version of 
this figure. 
  
 To quantify the degree of correspondence between predicted and observed fMRI 
patterns, we used the Tucker Congruence Coefficient (TCC)13 and the coefficient of 
determination R2 (similar to Borst et al., 2015). In addition, we used a weighted coefficient of 
determination Rw
2 (computed as the square of the weighted correlation between predictions 
and observations) which weights each point by the number of observations that were 
averaged to produce that point, whereby the averaging took place over participants and trial 
time. Table 1 compares predictions and observations on these three measures for the 10 brain 
regions of interest. The measures of correspondence between model and data are comparably 
good to work of others (e.g., the fit Borst et al., 2015, which established new mappings of 
modules to brain regions, shows TCCs in the range between .86 and .96 and R2s in the range 
of .67 and .93). There were also two important deviations: First, the visual regions failed to 
match the observed increase in BOLD response amplitude with number of attributes 
considered. Second, the two motor regions correlated more weakly with the predicted BOLD 
response than the remaining regions.  
 When developing ACT-R models, such discrepancies need to be explained and 
resolved so that they can, potentially, inform future model refinements. For instance, the 
weaker match between predictions and observations for the manual module was probably due 
to low motor activity: Motor activity (i.e., pressing a key on the response device) was 
 
13 TCC is used to assess the similarity of two quantities. Just like the correlation coefficient, it ranges between -1 
and 1. Unlike the correlation, TCC is based on the degree to which the quantities deviate from 0 as opposed to 
from their means.  
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necessary only once, at the end of each trial. This, in turn, probably resulted in a low signal 
relative to the BOLD noise. We can probably do nothing to further improve the motor 
predictions of our model. However, predictions based on the visual module and BOLD data 
recorded in the corresponding brain region exhibited low correlation and negative TCC. The 
negative TCC in particular means that the observed signal tends to follow the opposite sign 
from our predictions: Whenever the observed signal is positive, our predictions tend to be 
negative and vice versa. A visual inspection of Figure 12 further corroborates that our model 
fails to predict activity in the visual region. This might be due to a possible mismatch 
between our model and the sequence of cognitive processes that participants executed, calling 
for a further refinement our model to better match participants’ visual activity. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of empirical and model brain activity for the brain regions 
corresponding to the 5 modules active in our TTB implementation. 
Region TCC R2 Rw2 
Left manual .26 .08 .14 
Right manual .62 .21 .33 
Left visual -.51 .48 .29 
Right visual -.33 .20 .18 
Left procedural .80 .61 .73 
Right procedural .84 .73 .80 
Left imaginal .72 .52 .75 
Right imaginal .75 .58 .76 
Left declarative .94 .86 .87 
Right declarative .66 .30 .40 
Note. TCC = Tucker’s Congruence Coefficient, Rw2 = Weighted Coefficient of 
Determination. Rw
2 is computed by squaring the weighted correlation between predictions 
and observations. 
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Model Refinement 
There are often multiple ways of translating a model into a detailed architectural 
implementation. This holds also true when translating TTB’s search, stopping, and decision 
rules into ACT-R. Our first ACT-R implementation of TTB relied on a set of assumptions 
about how people would execute this strategy. Yet, the ROI analysis outlined above 
demonstrated that some of those assumptions may not hold. This provides us with an 
opportunity to further refine our model. What other ways are there to translate TTB into 
ACT-R? 
Currently, our model maintains the company names in a short-term store (i.e., the 
imaginal buffer). Yet, a participant might avoid the burden of storing this information that is 
readily available on the computer screen by reading one or both company names off the 
screen upon the inspection of each attribute. Additionally, our model stores both attribute 
values in the imaginal buffer before comparing them. Yet, the second attribute value is 
immediately accessible after being recalled (i.e., in the retrieval buffer) and it might not be 
necessary to first move it to the imaginal buffer before comparing the attribute values. 
Finally, when we attempt to retrieve knowledge from long-term memory, we often shift our 
visual attention (i.e., we look away) and so then need to reallocate it back to its initial 
position (i.e., towards the screen), while for our model visual attention is always on the last 
object that it looked at.  
We have created 7 additional models (Table 2) that vary according to these 
dimensions. TTB1 is the model that we have examined up to here. TTB2 reflects the intuition 
that people may access an attribute’s value directly after they recalled it instead of first 
moving it to a short-term store. Further reducing the amount of information maintained in 
short-term memory, TTB3 and TTB4 read company names off the computer screen instead of 
storing them in the imaginal buffer. TTB5 lies at the intersection between TTB1/TTB2 and 
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TTB3/TTB4, because it only maintains one company name in the imaginal buffer. Similarly, 
TTB6 and TTB7 are a combination of TTB1/TTB2 and TTB3/TTB4 as they not only look at 
both company names upon the inspection of each attribute, but also store those company 
names in the imaginal buffer. Finally, TTB8 is the model that loses the attentional focus once 
a retrieval starts and so attention needs to be reallocated after retrieval is completed. 
 
Table 2. Summary descriptions of the 8 implementations of TTB. 
Assumed processing steps TTB1 TTB2 TTB3 TTB4 TTB5 TTB6 TTB7 TTB8 
Store company names in 
imaginal buffer 
X X    X X  
Look back and forth upon 
inspecting each attribute 
  X X  X X X 
Store second attribute value 
in imaginal buffer 
X  X   X  X 
Store one company name in 
imaginal buffer 
    X    
Look at company name 
again after attribute is 
retrieved 
       X 
 
We submitted these eight implementations of TTB to a competitive test against each 
other. While all models generated comparable behavioral predictions (see sections S2 & S3 in 
Supplementary Online Materials), their neural predictions (see section S4 in Supplementary 
Online Materials for figures) pointed towards the most plausible among the models. Table 3 
reports goodness-of-fit measures for the neural predictions of our initial TTB implementation 
(TTB1), the best-fitting implementation (TTB8), and one with an intermediate fit (TTB4).  
These results illustrate the merits of an ROI analysis: Even though the behavioral 
measures produced by the models were very similar, the unique module-to-brain mappings 
afforded neural data to measure the contribution of each cognitive process separately. Put 
differently, variations in cognitive activity that lead to a noticeable change in a brain region’s 
activity can only be identified with the help of neural data. Identifying the degree of activity 
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of each cognitive function then allows us to point at the cognitive processes that most likely 
generated observed BOLD signals. In our case, that is TTB8, which assumes object names are 
not stored into the imaginal buffer. Instead, they are read off the computer screen every time 
they are needed. This model also assumes that visual attention is lost upon each retrieval 
attempt and then recovered once retrieval is completed. 
 
Table 3. Goodness-of-fit measures of 3 of the 8 TTB ACT-R implementations.   
Region 
TTB1 TTB4 TTB8 
TCC R2 Rw2 TCC R2 Rw2 TCC R2 Rw2 
Left manual .26 .08 .14 .26 .08 .15 .24 .07 .13 
Right manual .62 .21 .33 .63 .22 .34 .62 .22 .34 
Left visual -.51 .48 .29 .08 .02 .01 .75 .45 .70 
Right visual -.33 .20 .18 .20 .00 .03 .73 .42 .66 
Left procedural .80 .61 .73 .77 .56 .68 .68 .38 .55 
Right procedural .84 .73 .80 .84 .72 .80 .78 .54 .65 
Left imaginal .72 .52 .75 .55 .25 .54 .77 .56 .77 
Right imaginal .75 .58 .76 .60 .32 .56 .80 .61 .78 
Left declarative .94 .86 .87 .94 .85 .88 .95 .87 .89 
Right declarative .66 .30 .40 .66 .30 .41 .66 .29 .41 
Note. Models differ primarily in how well they predict the signal in the fusiform gyrus. The 
winner of the model comparison is TTB8 which predicts well brain activity related to the 
visual module. Neural predictions for the other 5 models can be found in section S4 in the 
Supplementary Online Materials.  
  
At the same time, these results illustrate another important aspect of ACT-R 
modeling: Cumulative theory building (see Marewski & Olsson, 2008). Specifically, the 
ACT-R architecture has been cumulatively refined, updated, and extended over the past 
decades, based on thousands of data points from experimental research from all over the 
world (current version: ACT-R 7). If one develops isolated models (e.g., of decision making 
or other cognitive processes) in ACT-R, a similar cumulative processes of theory building 
can take place. Typically, the model code is publicly shared, allowing for models developed 
on one data set (or a series of data sets) to be re-used and tested by researchers from other 
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labs on other data sets. The next step of what can be thought of an iterative research process 
of model development and continuous testing would be to submit our TTB implementations 
to tests on new data sets. Conducting such tests would be particularly important for TTB2-8, 
because those seven implementations emerged after the fact, as a result of a refinement of 
TTB1. Hence, in a strict sense, Table 3 reports actual model predictions from foresight only 
for TTB1, but not for the other implementations for which we adapted the model structure 
after the fact (although we did not re-estimate model parameters). The next competitive test 
of those models should therefore be conducted on new data.   
Summary 
We outlined how to develop an ACT-R model based on behavioral and neural data, 
using the TTB heuristic in memory-based decision making as a case in point. Importantly, the 
parameters of our model were constrained in a separate (i.e., learning) task, which as 
independent from and preceded the actual decision task (cf. Khader et al., 2011). The model 
was used to generate predictions about RTs and brain activation for a decision task, in which 
participants are instructed to use TTB to decide between two options, for which they had to 
retrieve decision-relevant information from memory. Overall, the RT predictions matched 
well both central tendencies and variability of individual participants’ data. The brain 
activation predictions of the first model corresponded well to observed fMRI signals in 
regions associated with the manual, retrieval, imaginal, and procedural buffers, but failed to 
predict activity in the visual region. Pushed by this failure, we further refined our model by 
generating alternative hypotheses about the sequence of processing steps, implemented them 
as ACT-R models and selected the model whose predictions best corresponded to observed 
fMRI data. 
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6. General Discussion 
Cognitive activities, such as decision making, are the result of various interplaying 
cognitive resources. When trying to understand such activities, researchers are faced with the 
challenge of separating the contribution of each cognitive capacity. In this article, we provide 
a step-by-step methodological primer of how to separate the contribution of each cognitive 
capacity by implemented models in ACT-R, and how such models can be tested with both 
behavioral and neural data, and further refined. As an illustrative example, we focused on a 
commonly studied model of decision making, the TTB heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). After estimating the free parameters of an ACT-R implementation of TTB using an 
independent learning task, we generated predictions about RTs and brain activation for a 
decision task, and tested those predictions on an fMRI dataset. Overall, both predicted RT 
distributions and temporal and spatial patterns of brain activity of our final model 
corresponded well to the observed data. Our results demonstrate that a properly specified and 
constrained model can predict both of these types of data, without any further adjustment of 
its parameters. As expected, if the components of that model are refined in an iterative 
process, the resulting models’ fit can further increase. More broadly, our results illustrate how 
decision making research can be grounded in more general cognitive theories (Dimov, 2018; 
Dimov & Link, 2017; Dimov, Marewski, & Schooler, 2013, 2017; Dougherty et al., 1999; 
Fechner et al., 2016; Fechner, Schooler, & Pachur, 2018; Fechner, Pachur, & Schooler, in 
press; Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003; Link, Marewski, & Schooler, 2016; Marewski & 
Mehlhorn, 2011; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005; Thomas, 
Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008). In fact, this approach might become a trend that, so 
we and others think, has the potential to ultimately revolutionize the field – once entry-level 
barriers to complex architectural modeling tools such as ACT-R break away. 
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In what follows, we (a) compare how our models would do in predicting participants’ 
RT data if we used a common set of parameters for all participants, (b) explicitly outline the 
four modeling principles that we followed in our model developing efforts, (c) refer readers 
to material relevant to ACT-R. 
Individual vs. Group Parameters 
 Two key features of our approach are, first, that we generate predictions (in our case, 
in the decision task) by estimating model parameters (i.e., mean activation, activation noise 
and retrieval threshold) on a different task from the task of interest (a learning task) and, 
second, that we do so separately for each participant. Constraining parameters in different 
tasks lends credence to architectural models (Newell, 1973) and, more generally, reducing the 
number of free parameters is a widely accepted good practice in psychology. Thus, we call 
for fitting free parameters on tasks separate from the main task whenever possible. Yet, how 
important is the estimation of individual parameter values for participants?  
At least since Estes (1956) it is known that artifacts in parameter estimation can 
emerge if model parameters are fitted to group data. For example, only when fitting to 
individual data Estes and Maddox (2005) could recover reasonable parameter values. Others 
argue that averaged data can change the underlying functional form, for example, from 
exponential at the individual level to a power function at the group level (Anderson & 
Tweney, 1997; Heathcore, Brown, & Mewhort, 2000; Myung, Kim, & Pitt, 2000). In our 
case, we will address this question by estimating common parameters from the learning data 
of all participants and generate new predictions with our model. To this end, we pool the RTs 
of all participants from the last round of the learning task, remove outliers, and fit memory 
parameters to those. 
Figure 13 demonstrates the group parameter fit and compares them to the individual 
parameter estimates. Not surprisingly, the common parameters fall in-between the individual 
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parameters: While individual mean activations range between -0.55 and 1.02, the common 
mean activation is 0.26; while estimated retrieval noise ranges between 0.3 and 0.88, 
common retrieval noise is 0.52.  
 
 
Figure 13. (a) Activation fit of all observed RTs in learning task to generate common 
memory parameters for all participants. ?̅? denotes estimated mean activation, s the retrieval 
noise and τ denotes the retrieval threshold. (b) Individual parameter estimates of mean 
activation and activation noise.  
 
It can be expected that for participants with parameters close to the mean parameters 
it would not matter much whether we use the individual or group parameters, while for 
participants with parameters at the extreme it will matter more. Figure 14 shows how much 
participants’ RTs deviate from model predictions with common vs. individual parameters. 
For more than half of the participants, it does not matter which parameters we use. For one 
participant (the right-most on the graph), the common parameters do better than the 
individual parameters that we estimated.  Finally, for 5 of the 17 participants (5 of the 6 
leftmost) using individual parameters improves the predictive power of our models. The 
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predictions for those participants are roughly between 0.5 s and 1.7 s more accurate with the 
individual than with the common parameters.  
 
 
Figure 14. RT deviation from median predicted RTs for model TTB1. With black is plotted 
MAD of individual runs of TTB1 (with memory parameters fitted separately for each 
participant) from median RTs of that model. The MAD of each participant’s RTs from 
median predicted RTs of TTB1 (with memory parameters fitted separately for each 
participant) is plotted in yellow. Red plots the MAD of each participant’s RTs from median 
predicted RTs of TTB1 (with memory parameters fitted on all participant’s data from the 
learning task). The black dots estimate how much the simulation varies from run to run. 
Participants’ RTs (in yellow) typically deviate more from median model predictions than any 
individual model run (see black error bars, which delineate the region between 10th and 90th 
percentile of RTs on each model run). Moreover, participants’ RTs deviate more for some 
participants from a model with a common set of memory parameters (in red) than from a 
model with individual memory parameters (in yellow).    
 
Which procedure – individual or average parameters – should be adopted when 
developing ACT-R models? In general, we recommend working with individualized 
parameter values, because people differ in terms of their ability to, for instance, remember 
information. People also differ in terms of the statistical structure of real-world environments 
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they have encountered. For instance, if our experimental data set had not entailed fictitious, 
but realistic stimuli names, one might expect that people with different prior real-world 
exposure histories to company names would have different activation levels for the same 
company names (see section 2 on ACT-R’s subsymbolic system). Note that computing 
individualized parameter values does not lead to the problem of overfitting if, as we have 
done, the resulting models are tested with fixed parameter values on a different task for each 
participant. Pooling data, in turn, can became an interesting option when the number of 
observations available for each individual participant is sparse and when one has reasons to 
assume that individual differences across participants are negligible. That said, when working 
with pooled data the modeler should be aware of the problem that the average parameter 
values used might not correspond to any individual and also of the artifacts that might arise 
from estimating parameters from group data. 
Individual differences in decision strategy 
While individual parameter values lead to predictions which are at least as good as a 
common set of parameters for all participants, our model still does not capture all the 
variance in participants’ data. This might be partially due to the limited size of the learning 
data sample, which does not allow us to perfectly estimate the values of memory parameter. 
Other, human, factors such as accumulating fatigue or distraction might also play a role. Yet 
another possibility for the unaccounted variance might lie in inter-participant variability in 
strategy selection. In decision making, it is well known that participants vary widely in the 
strategies they adopt when facing a decision problem and results typically consist of 
tendencies of switching from one strategy to another as certain experimental factors are 
manipulated rather than a unanimous adoption of a single decision strategy (see, e.g., Bröder, 
2012). Even in a task as the one that we are modeling, in which participants are instructed to 
follow a particular strategy, each participant might still be executing TTB in their specific 
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manner. In this case, different participants would be best described by different TTB 
implementations.   
Another potential source of variability that we do not include in our analysis is that 
potential for strategy switching as the experiment progresses. Factors such as fatigue, 
exploration or reinforcement (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) might slowly increase the likelihood 
that one implementation of TTB is executing over another. For example, a participant might 
start by storing all information in the short-term store (i.e., the imaginal module) similar to 
TTB1 and then discover that it is more efficient to not store information readily available to 
visual attention, as in TTB8. Exploring such individual differences is another potential 
pathway of model refining.  
Principles for Model Development and Testing in Cognitive Architectures  
 Modeling frameworks as complex as ACT-R, which consists of multiple interplaying 
components and many adjustable parameters, are sometimes criticized for being capable of 
fitting everything (Pohl, 2011; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Yet, such critique is misleading. 
ACT-R models make extremely precise multi-dimensional predictions (i.e., about different 
variables, including RT, BOLD signals, eye-movements, etc.) that can be easily proved 
wrong in experiments. Our analysis of our ACT-R implementations of TTB serve to 
illustrate, by means of a practical example, methods for creating strong tests beds for 
architectural process models (see Figure 4 for a roadmap of the steps that we followed). 
Specifically, we followed four modeling principles (Dimov & Marewski, 2018).   
 First, while the ACT-R cognitive architecture has a certain number of free parameters, 
the calibration of those parameters is neither arbitrary nor is the careful modeler fully free to 
“choose” his/her parameter values. A common standard in the ACT-R community is to use, 
wherever possible, ACT-R’s default parameter values. If parameters need to be estimated, 
those parameters ought to be constrained on different data sets and tasks (see A. Newell, 
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1990; see also Anderson, 2007). In developing our model, we used the specified default 
parameter values if feasible and calibrated all models’ free declarative parameters on the 
learning task, and then carried over those parameter values unchanged to the decision task 
(Figure 4, steps 1 & 2). 
Second, ACT-R models ought to be tested in predicting new, unseen data rather than 
in fitting existing data. Fitting refers to situations where a model’s free parameters are 
estimated from the human data by minimizing the difference between the human and the 
model. In contrast, testing a model’s predictions entails evaluating a model’s ability to 
reproduce human data to which the model has not been calibrated, that is, out-of-sample with 
fixed parameters (Marewski & Olsson, 2008; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002; Roberts & 
Pashler, 2000). After having developed our ACT-R implementation of TTB and calibrated its 
memory parameters on an independent behavioral task (see Figure 4, steps 1 & 2), we 
predicted, out of sample, participants’ decisions, RTs, and neural patterns in the decision task 
(Figure 4, steps 3, 4 & 6). 
Third, ACT-R models allow making detailed quantitative predictions about 
distributions of human data, rather than merely predicting means, medians or other point 
estimates (for a related approach, see Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Predicting the complexities of 
multiple distributions creates very strong tests for models, and often even merely trying to fit 
(rather than to predict) those distributions, poses a serious challenge. For example, Marewski 
and Mehlhorn (2011) specified 39 ACT-R models of decision making with none of them 
being able to fit and predict human RT distributions perfectly in two experiments. Yet, if only 
median RTs would have served as a criterion for model selection, several of those models 
would have been wrongly judged as being able to account equally well for human data. In our 
current analyses, we used our ACT-R implementation of TTB to predict distributional 
patterns (Figure 4, step 4). 
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Fourth, models are not evaluated in isolation, but in their ability to make predictions, 
out of sample, relative to each other. In such model comparisons, models’ predictions about 
dynamic distributional data, and not just means, should be contrasted. This way, we might 
discover that no model accounts perfectly for both central tendencies and variabilities of 
various types of data, but, instead, we can establish the degree to which one model better 
predicts the data than another. The best model can then serve as a benchmark in future 
evaluations.   
 
ACT-R Resources 
 In closing, we provide resources to get the reader started with ACT-R. First, the 
software package for the appropriate operating system can be downloaded from the ACT-R 
website (http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/software/). In addition to ACT-R, that website contains 
tutorials, a reference guide and other documentation, which can aid the beginner modeler in 
immersing into the theory. Moreover, the website contains additional resources, such as a list 
of publications related to ACT-R and a list of researches working with this architecture. 
Publications cover a broad range of topics and usually come together with ACT-R models, 
which can be freely downloaded. For those willing to experiment with ACT-R without 
engaging with Common Lisp, versions in Java (jACT-R, http://jact-r.org/; Java ACT-R, 
http://cog.cs.drexel.edu/act-r/) and Python (pyact, https://github.com/jakdot/pyactr/; Python 
ACT-R, https://sites.google.com/site/pythonactr/) exist, while the related ACTransfer theory 
and software (Taatgen, 2013) is written in Swift (to be downloaded from 
https://github.com/ntaatgen/ACTransfer). However, the most complete and up-to-date version 
of ACT-R is the one developed in Lisp and, since version 7.5, ACT-R includes a new 
interface that allows interacting with the architecture through any programming langue. 
Additionally, we refer those interested in modeling neural data with ACT-R to the excellent 
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tutorial provided by Borst and Anderson (2017). Finally, we recommend future (ACT-R) 
modelers to seek out the literature on methods for model selection. A short overview 
(pertinent to ACT-R) is provided in Marewski and Olsson (2008).   
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Appendix 
 Figure A1 is a description of a run of the final model, which extended the model 
described on Figure 3 by adding an inter-trial interval and a presentation cross. The 
presentation cross leads to additional visual activity when the model attends to the presented 
cross, while the inter-trial interval is a time of inactivity, during which the BOLD signal can 
decay. Thus, adding these two components to our model modifies its BOLD predictions. To 
simplify the understanding of the extended model, we have added screen events, which depict 
what is happening on the screen at this point in time, and mental events, which are higher 
level descriptions of what the model does at this point in time. For example, 2000 ms after 
the trial starts, the two company names are presented on the screen (see screen event). At this 
point, the model starts encoding the two company names off the screen (mental events “read 
company 1” and “read company 2”) and, after determining that the names are different, starts 
executing TTB (mental event “names different; start TTB”). 
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Figure A1. Schematic process trace of an ACT-R implementation of TTB as applied to this 
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experiment. The y-axis denotes various ACT-R modules and associated brain regions. LIPFC 
= Lateral Inferior Prefrontal Cortex. PPC = Posterior Parietal Cortex. See the online article 
for the color version of this figure. 
 
